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Using CloudFlare implicitly requires trusting CloudFlare.

With this, CloudFlare cannot impersonate you without your endpoint's active consent. As soon as you terminate the service that solves this puzzle for CF, they cannot impersonate you any longer.

So, yes, it is better. Maybe not "great" if your threat model includes CF getting 0wned, but definitely better than giving over your RSA key. ;)



And that's why regulations make it almost impossible for banks to use CloudFare. But CloudFare sees that as a problem, and makes some effort to create a loophole.

You can't claim that this improves the bank clients' security. It's clearly worse than doing nothing.


Think of it as a compromise: You can leverage CloudFlare's CDN to mitigate DDoS and other sorts of nasty attacks AND assure TLS is used with every connection, without giving up your RSA key.

"It's clearly worse than doing nothing." It's not very clear to me. Please explain.


I think "It's clearly worse than doing nothing" is from a purely security perspective. This opens up a larger attack surface, so it's worse in terms of security. But it's better than doing nothing from a business perspective, since it allows for better performance and better handling of DDOS attacks. It's a comprimise. Potentially it is slightly worse in security, but it is much better for performance and uptime.


I think the parent means the key server the bank exposes to CF is a new attack surface. If an attacker could impersonate CF and connect to the key server, they too could authenticate connections as the bank without having the key.




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