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From their description it appears encrypted CC numbers were in the database amongst the other customer information. Sure, the data has to live somewhere, but the apparent situation of CC, customer, private key all accessible to the frontend looks sub-optimal.


there's a difference between obtaining the private key and the private key file, which according to Linode was protected with a (hopefully strong) passphrase...


It might have been encrypted, but surely it must be exposed to their system somewhere to enable them to make charges? Is it feasible, if that was the case, that the attackers could use that to exfiltrate decrypted CC info?

I suppose this wild speculation isn't helpful or conducive and waiting on more information might be a better idea. I think the reputation damage has already been done, judging by the comments on the previous post though.


It depends on how they implemented it. Maybe there's an operator that logs on once a day and enters the passphrase, and then they use it to charge credit cards. So the private key is exposed only for a brief period.

Another possibility is that the passphrase is entered when the machine is booted, and then the private key (not the passphrase) is loaded into memory. This is how e.g. ssh-agent[1] works. When this mechanism is used, you don't get access to the private key itself without direct memory access (which is possible, but not that easy to carry out, and would typically require root access and debug tools etc). However, the private key can be then used to carry out crypto operations.

From the IRC chat logs, it looks like ryan got the private key file, but he didn't get the private key itself. At least he didn't seem to provide any solid proof to suggest he did.

[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ssh-agent


It's possible to debug targets running under the current user, so root privileges might not have been needed, if they had an agent running under the same UID as the application.

> However, the private key can be then used to carry out crypto operations.

Surely this is of concern? According to the logs they'd known about the breach for a week - that seems like enough time to decrypt each card one by one and exfiltrate them.


Why would you keep the private key file on a machine on which you would never enter the passphrase?




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