> everyone else is trying but haven't really shown much promise
What was the incentive/funding for their attempts? In a non-national-security scenario it makes sense not to try too hard because you can just buy ASML's solution.
With China it's a bit different, if they decide it's a matter of national security and pour Manhattan-project-levels of money/resources into it, they could make faster progress.
Well yeah. No one is saying that China cannot do that. Just that the political calculus is that it's better for China to spend their resources on that, rather than building up troops and warships.
Force Chinas growth to be more expensive. It has nothing to do with not believing China can do it, it's about slowing them down in a task we believe that they can do.
> Just that the political calculus is that it's better for China to spend their resources on that, rather than building up troops and warships.
Note that this calculus only makes sense if you invade China while they are busy with the EUV machines, otherwise they catch up technologically and then build all the scary military.
Of course, the the calculus doesn't make sense at all, because the obvious order when you can't do both is you build enough military to feel safe first, then you try for the tech race.
Their plan was to buy those chips and equipment and have the troops/ships/weapons sooner.
Now China has to build EUV themselves, then mass produce chips. It slows them down regardless and costs them resources.
Cut off the market before it becomes a problem.
---------
Militarily, delaying China into 2040s after the USA has stealth destroyers of our own (beginning production in late 2020s, mass production in the 2030s) means China has to fight vs 2030s era tech instead of our 1980s era Arleigh Burke DDGs.
What, do you want to have the fight in late 2020s or would you rather have the war in late 2030s? There is a huge difference and USAs production schedule cannot change. But we can change Chinas production schedule.
> the obvious order when you can't do both is you build enough military to feel safe first, then you try for the tech race
Literally zero actual wars with a technological component have progressed like this. (The first tradeoff to be made is the one Russia is making: sacrificing consumption for military production and research. Guns and butter.)
That's not true. Mass/quantity can still resist/delay/push back until you're exhausted and done.
We're not anymore in the swords vs guns era. We're talking about hypersonic missiles vs super intelligent hypersonic missiles. Still, all it takes is 1 dumb missile to pass through the defenses and an entire city can be wiped off. At the end of the day, they don't care if a missiles didn't reach the precise target. As you can see in Ukraine, Russia is bombing all types of buildings, they don't give a damn about schools, kindergarten or so.
> We're not anymore in the swords vs guns era. We're talking about hypersonic missiles vs super intelligent hypersonic missiles
These are still hypotheticals. Every war since the Civil War has had a decisive technological component. If the model doesn't apply there, this time probably ain't different.
Yes. Concern around Soviet space and missiles capabilities overtaking America’s directly lead to Kennedy changing his mind on no boots on the ground.
(The Vietnam War started with America betting on BVR, with the long-seeing but minimally-agile F-4 Phantom. Soviet MiG-21s, on the other hand, blended into civilian traffic. This lead to disaster. When the MiG-25 rolled out, we countered with the F-15 Eagle. But it came too late, which meant we couldn’t establish air superiority with long-range aircraft alone.)
Note: I’m not saying this was the decisive component. It was one among many, and not the most important. But if we had F-15s at the outset, when the Soviets had MiG-21s, there is a better chance the skirmish would have stayed in the skies and Vietnam would have stalemated like Korea.
> it's about slowing them down in a task we believe that they can do.
But it's not slowing them down. It's forcing them to accelerate development ( aka investing more into the sector ). Has china invested more or less? It's amazing how blind people are to this counterintuitive fact.
> Oh, and your plan is to just give them the chips they want directly?
"Give them"? I love sneaky propagandists. No, make them pay for it. It's what we do to our "allies" so that they are dependent on american tech.
> Of course investing into chip development is slowing China down.
From a myopic narrow point of view. But viewed more broadly, it has accelerated china's tech development.
> Its slower to build their own than for us to give them those chips.
In the short term, but not the long term. Just like banning china from participating in the international space station forced china to accelerate their development of their space program.
> From a myopic narrow point of view. But viewed more broadly, it has accelerated china's tech development.
Yes. I'm fine with this.
Weakening China in the short term means pushing the Taiwan war timeline by years. Years that we will spend building up the DDG(X).
As I said before and I'll say again: USA is weak in 2020s but strong in the 2030s. We only need to delay China by a few years and the DDG(X) changes everything.
----------
You need to understand that I make my view based on the perceived strength of the US Navy. The US Navy is getting huge upgrades and a few years of delay makes an incredible difference.
> For what? The US Navy will play no role in a war between china and taiwan.
Uhhhhh, Taiwan is an island dude. That's either Marines or Navy. I'm betting Navy will do the heavy lifting given that China is missile heavy.
Marines might be used to shore up anti-landing defenses if China decides to send boots on the ground. But ideally the US Navy prevents the landing entirely.
Said war taking place while we have 1980s-era Arleigh Burke Destroyers would be an attack while our Navy is at our weakest. Anything we can do to delay said war until after the DDG(X) upgrade is to our advantage.
> No offense, but who gives a shit about taiwan? Not americans. Only chinese people care about taiwan.
I'm American and I care? That's why I'm arguing on this point.
Current wargames suggest that USA will be willing to dedicate like 2 carrier strike groups for the defense of Taiwan. I'm not sure if it's enough (especially with the aging Arleigh Burke destroyers), but that's the level of commitment mostly assumed in this scenario if not more.
We have like 14 Carrier strike groups for a reason. We can spare two of them to this task, maybe more.
If you ask PRC shills, it's just around the corner because this one Chinese lab demonstrated a very small part of the system.
And a surprising number of westerners fall for that crap.
My guess is that it's at least 10 years away, but that could obviously change depending on what resources they're willing to commit.
But even at that point they'll be 2 decades behind ASML's EUV tech so it probably won't be competitive.
GP must have been asking for the non-PRC shill opinion.
> My guess is that it's at least 10 years away,
That doesn't sound at all like a lot. China has a uniquely effective industrial espionage... industry, combined with a very thick geopolitical skin and disregard for international demands. This helps accelerate any process that others have already perfected.
We'll start to see the real deal if/when China eventually catches up to the leaders in every field and the only way to pull ahead is to be entirely self propelled (you can't take advantage of someone else's draft when you're in front of the pack).
There are things which needs time, even with all or almost all the information at hand, just like with atomic bomb. I’m not sure whether this case similar to that, but that ASML in front for so much time indicates that their moot is probably not just information.
The US finished developing a nuclear bomb in 1945, by 1949 the Soviet Union had their own. I agree that it is probably not the same, there are a lot more moving parts in modern chip design. In fact, I have no idea how close Chinese companies are to developing SotA chips. But I do see China being consistently underestimated in western media and think tanks, so my intuitive reaction would be to cut that timeline in half if it is what western experts believe to be plausible.
See also: military jet engines. They can't replicate high end engines from Pratt & Whitney or GE even though I'm guessing Chinese intelligence services have a huge amount of relevant information. I don't know why that is.
It's probably hands on experience that's missing. Even with the all the technical details, often times there's practical details on using this machine or tiny tweaks that need to be made to get it working well.
According to this video (Asionometry - guy from Taiwan, hardly a PRC shill) Chinese EUV are now tested in Huawei factories and should come into production in 2026.
“The company's commitment to innovation is highlighted by its substantial investment of 179.7 billion yuan ($24.77 billion) in research and development (R&D), accounting for 20.8 percent of its annual revenue. Its total R&D investment over the past decade has reached 1.249 trillion yuan ($172.21 billion).”
I rewatched the whole video and did not find where he said that. Quite the opposite, he says Chinese EUV academic research is at 2005 levels and is rather unimpressive.
And how far out is that?