> Spoofing radar signals isn't exactly new, and the ability to do it on the ground (so to speak) shouldn't be surprising. The military has been doing it for decades.
People who are interested in finding out more can look up Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) jammers.
I don't mean to sound pessimistic, but the link's assertion that any of these techniques are new suggests that either allaboutcircuits is not familiar with radar/electronic attack or that Duke University and/or the automative radar folks are not up to speed with techniques used in radar/electronic attack in the defense/aerospace industries. Maybe it's the latter, as the arXiv preprint states "...show the novel ability to effectively ‘add’ (i.e., false positive attacks), ‘remove’ (i.e., false negative attacks), or ‘move’ (i.e., translation attacks) object detections...".
The arXiv preprint doesn't list any of the usual suspects for radar or electronic attack sources that I would expect to see in its references. There are a lot of automotive radar sources and, interestingly enough, some LiDAR and LiDAR adversarial attacks instead.
As the sibling comment from zeeed mentioned, yes — in this case.
More generally maybe but not always. If you wanted to use a DRFM jammer to insert false targets in an imaging radar, the bandwidths required may be a challenge.
There are commercial SAR satellite operators that you (for some definition of you — I personally couldn’t afford it) can buy from that sell imagery that’s got a resolution of 0.5 meters per pixel. That would require a bandwidth of about 300MHz. I haven’t looked at the SDR landscape in awhile but when I did that was sort of sporty — by that I mean >300 complex megasamples a second (for Nyquist, not including any oversampling).
And that would be after basebanding in analog before sampling to digital.
People who are interested in finding out more can look up Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) jammers.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_radio_frequency_memory
I don't mean to sound pessimistic, but the link's assertion that any of these techniques are new suggests that either allaboutcircuits is not familiar with radar/electronic attack or that Duke University and/or the automative radar folks are not up to speed with techniques used in radar/electronic attack in the defense/aerospace industries. Maybe it's the latter, as the arXiv preprint states "...show the novel ability to effectively ‘add’ (i.e., false positive attacks), ‘remove’ (i.e., false negative attacks), or ‘move’ (i.e., translation attacks) object detections...".
These are open data, too. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radar_jamming_and_deception.
The arXiv preprint doesn't list any of the usual suspects for radar or electronic attack sources that I would expect to see in its references. There are a lot of automotive radar sources and, interestingly enough, some LiDAR and LiDAR adversarial attacks instead.