Well, it's interesting, and I'm sure the author knows way more about the topic than I do, but I kept seeing things like this:
"Most units do not talk directly to supporting artillery, so there is a delay in call for fire missions. We have been told that units will use runners to send fire missions to artillery batteries because of issues with communications."
...followed by something like this:
"The Ukrainian Armed Forces have a hodgepodge of radios that are vulnerable to jamming."
...which sounds like the use of runners is a pragmatic and effective way to deal with the problem. Also:
"Unit commanders have concerns about collaborators and thus are hesitant to pass on critical information that can be used against them to sister units."
...similarly sounds like the differences in how Ukraine is doing things (compared to NATO doctrine) might be based on their experience in a messy reality, rather than a lack of training. NATO has not fought a near-peer war in generations, and never against one where the enemy had spent a decade building up intelligence assets/collaborators. Ukraine has been fighting one since 2014. Moreover, there is probably not a military in the world that is better equipped to judge the relative merits of Soviet-style vs. NATO-style doctrine.
I'm sure some of the authors' points are valid, but I have to wonder if a majority might not be mistaken, given that Ukraine has a situation vastly different than NATO doctrine was designed for, in terms of their hodgepodge of equipment and etc.
"Most units do not talk directly to supporting artillery, so there is a delay in call for fire missions. We have been told that units will use runners to send fire missions to artillery batteries because of issues with communications."
...followed by something like this:
"The Ukrainian Armed Forces have a hodgepodge of radios that are vulnerable to jamming."
...which sounds like the use of runners is a pragmatic and effective way to deal with the problem. Also:
"Unit commanders have concerns about collaborators and thus are hesitant to pass on critical information that can be used against them to sister units."
...similarly sounds like the differences in how Ukraine is doing things (compared to NATO doctrine) might be based on their experience in a messy reality, rather than a lack of training. NATO has not fought a near-peer war in generations, and never against one where the enemy had spent a decade building up intelligence assets/collaborators. Ukraine has been fighting one since 2014. Moreover, there is probably not a military in the world that is better equipped to judge the relative merits of Soviet-style vs. NATO-style doctrine.
I'm sure some of the authors' points are valid, but I have to wonder if a majority might not be mistaken, given that Ukraine has a situation vastly different than NATO doctrine was designed for, in terms of their hodgepodge of equipment and etc.