I don't know exactly how the game goes. I'm sure there is no one single solution to it.
If China detected nuclear capable missiles heading toward their country then they would have to consider the possibility their second strike capability is not a sufficient deterrent (including being compromised in various ways such as their subs being all located) so there seems like a large incentive to retaliate before missiles land.
Would there be enough time for them to watch and wait it out and see if it approached their missile installations? If it was a very stealthy missile, could they be sure they had detected them all?
No, armies do not have their finger on nuclear trigger with a time horizon of 30-ish minutes. We are not in the 1960s when at times it was literally true.
The concept of nuclear triad is that, yes, armies very strongly depend on their second-strike capability. So, the game is for the subs to not to become compromised.
> No, armies do not have their finger on nuclear trigger with a time horizon of 30-ish minutes.
> We are not in the 1960s when at times it was literally true.
You are claiming that not only China, but the US and Russia don't have the capability of launching strikes from 30 minutes? (i.e., well beyond the time to respond to ballistic missile launch detection)? Do you have a source for this?
Launch-On-Warning
One source of ambiguity in the implementation of China's no-first-use policy is the ongoing debate in China regarding the pursuit of a launch-on-warning posture. Recent doctrinal publications and Chinese interlocutors indicated that the debate has yet to be resolved. On one side, some members of China’s strategic community argued that a launch-on-warning posture would ensure the survivability of its nuclear deterrent if its opponent has robust targeting intelligence. The Science of Military Strategy states that a launch-on-warning posture "is in accordance with China's long-standing no-first-use policy, and may effectively protect China's nuclear forces from sustaining even greater losses, improving the survivable nuclear counterstrike capability of China’s nuclear missile forces." China's first priority should be to prevent its adversary from precisely locating its missile launch positions. If China is able to reliably ascertain that an adversary has already launched nuclear missiles at China, however, China could quickly launch its nuclear missiles for a counterstrike "before the enemy has been able to actually inflict nuclear destruction." Launch-on-warning would therefore provide China with an option for nuclear retaliation if a nuclear adversary were able to overcome Chinese efforts at concealment, deception, and mobility to ensure that its forces survived a first strike.
This touches on what I was talking about too. The next few paragraphs interestingly provide a counter-point that disagrees China would take this posture, but not because they don't have the capability to retaliate quickly enough, but for other reasons.
Yes, I was writing about launch-on-warning posture although I can now see I could have been more clear. As far as I know no country is presently assuming that it is able to detect, interpret, and authoritatively decide to enter full-scale nuclear war within ~25 minutes of enemy ICBMs' launch. (Leaving say ~5 minutes to implement the decision.)
What you cited is sad, but firstly it is still an "ongoing debate", and secondly the road from declarations to the actual ability is long with this one. And may it never materialize again.
> Yes, I was writing about launch-on-warning posture although I can now see I could have been more clear. As far as I know no country is presently assuming that it is able to detect, interpret, and authoritatively decide to enter full-scale nuclear war within ~25 minutes of enemy ICBMs' launch. (Leaving say ~5 minutes to implement the decision.)
Do you have a source for that?
The sibling comment says Russia and USA have a prompt alert which can launch in under 15 minutes. Other articles say the US president could be contacted and approve in under 30 seconds, not sure how the Russian chain of command goes.
The decision process does not begin when nukes are detected of course, that's the end of the process. Pre agreed criteria have already been met. Quite likely there is no decision about entering a full scale nuclear war because they are already in one.
Pretty much this, both sides know that a large surprise attack against the entire triad would be effective. That’s why monitoring of military exercises and other precursors is critical. It’s very hard to kill all nuclear capable aircraft when they are already in the air. Placing all submarines on an alert posture also helps prevent the possibility that they’ve been intercepted. An around the clock war room helps ensure the president makes the decision to launch.
Actually, since the invention of ballistic missiles we are permanently 30 minutes from death. There are around 900 flight ready warheads both in US and Russia.
