It's multi-dimensional. SCADA itself being networked, and it reaching other systems that may be internet-enabled.
* What systems are affected by the hack?
* Could the shutdown be needed because of critical data the ICS gets from business?
* Or is it shut down because business needs real-time data from ICS it can't ingest?
In general, the idea of completely isolating an ICS from any other network is a tough one.
My question is, how often are these critical suppliers audited by the federal government? I have worked in banking cybersecurity and the amount of auditing from federal and state regulators is mind boggling. If a single company controls 45% of fuel transport to the east coast, it should carry some designation as a quasi-state entity subject to federal cybersecurity audits like banks.
This question of missing cyber security audits came up for me in discussion of the Verkada hack. That’s the startup providing security cameras inside hospitals, prisons and schools.
It seems like cybersecurity and audits of security readiness need to be demanded from any authority over companies operating in sensitive areas.
My question is, how often are these critical suppliers audited by the federal government? I have worked in banking cybersecurity and the amount of auditing from federal and state regulators is mind boggling. If a single company controls 45% of fuel transport to the east coast, it should carry some designation as a quasi-state entity subject to federal cybersecurity audits like banks.